Wednesday, May 27, 2015

FIFA! CORRUPT? THE FEDS, RICO, RATS, SNITCHES, AND INDICTMENTS

FIFA IS CORRUPT! 

14 INDICTMENTS UNSEALED!

WHO REMAINS?

Ideas:

  1. How does the U.S. D.O.J. have jurisdiction?
  2. What is RICO?
  3. Do we know who all the rats are?
  4. Rackateering
  5. Wirefraud
  6. Money Laundering
  7. Indictment against Daryan signed by Loretta Lynch



Finally.  It has happened.  The American Feds have indicted and arrested 14 FIFA officials.  IN SWITZERLAND!

My bet is that Sepp Blatter has been indicted.  The only reason he was not arrested and the indictment unsealed is because he is a Swiss national, and Switzerland does not extradite its own citizens. 

My other bet is that the rats and snitches, such as Chuck Blazer, are ratting on Sepp Blatter so that theu can live out the rest of their lives in Trump Tower where they hide their stashes of cash.

I have another hunch.  I have a feeling that Sunil Gulati, the President of U.S. Soccer.

"These defendants took the soccer enterprise and turned it into a criminal enterprise."  

As a criminal defense lawyer that practices soccer law, I am familiar with FIFA.  I will write more soon.

Thursday, May 14, 2015

Unlawful Carrying Of A Weapon Motion To Suppress Post-Rodriguez

I was almost there.  I was so close that I could feel it.  I could touch it.  I could see it.  I could see the Montgomery County Judge saying, "Motion To Suppress Granted," and the State of Texas saying "Judge we will file this Motion to Dismiss."  However, it wasn't to be.  It wasn't to be because we worked the case us so good that the Montgomery County prosecutor dismissed both cases in exchange for my client forfeiting his handgun.

For the record, I would not have taken that deal under the circumstances, that's how confident I was in the facts of the case, my legal research, and that I would not let the government steal my gun (if I had one).  However, as a client-centered lawyer, my job, my obligation is to inform my clients about the procedure, the potential courses of action, and the potential consequences of each course of action.  In this case, the dismissals were all he wanted.

So, let's rewind to May of 2014, in a little speed-trap of a town called Patton Village.  My client was driving a car his mother bought him for graduation north on highway 59 to visit his mother in Mississippi.  He was traveling in the left lane, allegedly, without passing other vehicles.  A Patton Village Cop followed him for, according to the cop, three miles.  The cop turns on his dashboard camera as the cars approach the Liberty County Line (where liberty goes to die).  In the video, you can see that my client's car is getting further from the white car in the right hand lane, and closer to the semi in front of him, thus appearing to be passing traffic and nullifying the reason for the stop.

The officer turns on his overhead emergency lights and pulls my client over.  My client turns on his signal and makes safe lane changes until he comes to a safe stop on the shoulder, at which point he turns on his hazard lights.  The Patton Village Cop calls in my client's Mississippi license plate number, exits his vehicle and goes to the driver door.  The cop talks to my African American client for a full minute with his window down.  My client gives the cop his license, insurance and registration, just as he's supposed to, and the cop orders my client out of the car.  The cop waits for a another cop to arrive (not in the offense report as it should be) then returns to the squad car and runs my client's driver license. 

About 15 minutes later, the cop learns that there are no arrest warrants for my client, he has no criminal history, he has only been pulled over once before, and that his car is coming back as stolen.  The cop places my client under arrest and puts him in the back of the squad car.  My client tells the officer that there must be a mistake, I mean, after all, the his registration and insurance are for that car, they have his name on it along with his mother's name, who shares the same last name and is registered to her address in Mississippi which is the address on my client's driver's license.

The officer agrees to call my client's mother.  To be fair, he could have been a real big jerk and not done that, but on the other side of the token, the evidence before him was that the car was not stolen.  His story made sense.  So, the cop calls my client's mother who answers.  The cop says hes in a stolen car.  She asks what he's driving.  She cuts him off,  "is it a black 2006 chevy hhr?"  Indeed it was.  She assures the cop that the car was not stolen.  The cop sayd he would let her son go in a few moments.

The cop then tells my client he is letting him go, but requests consent to search his vehicle.  My client exercises his Fourth Amendment right to deny the officer consent to search.  At this point, under a new Supreme Court Case called Rodriguez v. United States, the cop had a duty to let my client go.  Instead, the cop called a K9 to search the outside of my client's car.  The K9 arrives 15 minutes later (after more than an hour had already passed where the officer could have called the K9, or actually just searched the car since he had probable cause to believe a crime had been committed).  The K9 made two hits, and the cops recovered some weed and pistol.

We argued that the fruit of the search, were fruits of the poisonous tree, and must be suppressed.  In layman's terms, the cops illegally searched my client's car.

So quick rundown on searches and seizures.  A cop can search a person or a place if there is a valid search warrant.  IF there is not a valid search warrant, the search is presumed to be unlawful.  An officer can search for contraband if he has probable cause."  Probable cause is exists where facts and circumstances are sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts (that a person committed a crime) are probably true.  Probable cause to search exists if the cop sees the person commit the crime, the contraband is in plain view, the officer's smells the weed... so on and so forth.

Here, the cop did not see and dope in plain view. The law holds that an officer must diligently pursue all reasonable avenues to confirm or dispel a belief, and that they must execute the ordinary tasks of a traffic stop in a diligent manner.  So, an officer may not prolong a traffic stop to call a dog or conduct a search without probable cause. 

What are the ordinary tasks of a traffic stop, you may ask?  Investigating and issuing a ticket, running a warrant check to see if the driver if the driver is wanted for arrest, and do a license plate check to see if the car is stolen.  In this case, the officer did a reasonable diligent job in doing the above, and he did a pretty great job at investigating once the car was stolen.  However, once he determined the car was stolen, he did not have the right to detain my client any longer, unless he had developed a reasonable suspicion to believe my client was engaged in or was about to be engaged in criminal activity. FYI, all you officers out there, a HUNCH IS NOT ENOUGH TO DETAIN A MOTORIST!!!  

In this case, the officer did not have an articulable  reasonable suspicion to continue detaining my client and it was his right, as it is yours, dear reader, to DENY CONSENT TO SEARCH his vehicle.  My client did not make incriminating statement, there was nothing in plain view, the car was not stolen, he was not a known drug dealer, he did not come from a known drug house, he was not intoxicated, his story made sense, he was calm, cooperative, honest, did not attempt to flee... I could continue, but you get the point.

There are a litany of cases that define what a cop can and cannot do in regard to a traffic stop.  Rodriguez is great because it affirms absent a reasonable suspicion, the extension of a traffic stop a.k.a. prolonged detention is an unreasonable seizure, and that calling a K9 is not an ordinary or traditional aspect of a traffic stop.

If you have been arrested you need to hire a lawyer who loves to investigate unlawful searches and seizures.  You need a lawyer who can read an offense report and smell something fishy.  You need a lawyer who enjoys researching to protect your liberties.  


Wednesday, May 6, 2015

HOW DO YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION



I just returned from a trip to our nation's capitol.  I went to D.C. for the Anti-Defamation League Glass Leadership Institute Summit.  The Anti-Defamation League is a nongovernmental organization that fights against hate and for civil rights.  

The trip was amazing.  I attended several panels, asked pressing questions of the associate director of the FBI for terrorism, and someone in a similar position in the White House. I met Senator Cory Booker and saw John McCain speak.  I also had the opportunity to do a lot of walking and a lot of touring. 

I saw four things that were extremely moving:  The Declaration of Independence, United States Constitution, The Bill of Rights, and the flag that inspired the Star-Spangled Banner.

Over the course of my weekend in D.C. I was asked many times, "How do you do it?  How do you defend criminals?  How do you defend people you know are guilty?"  In fact, I have been asked these questions ever since I began practicing criminal law.  Those four pieces of American History are the lights that guide me to represent those accused among us.  My response to these questions is always that if my client is not free, if my client is not guaranteed all of his rights under the Constitution, if my client if not treated how you would expect to be treated if you were in his position, you are not free, you will not have those rights and protections, and you will be treated no better than him.

Clarence Darrow said it best, if you are not free, I am not free.

One of my clients will be charged with Intoxicated Manslaughter.  One of my mentors asked me if I'll take the case, and I told him that I'm not sure if I can because a childhood friend of mine was recently killed by a drunk driver.  My mentor, Eric Davis, stopped me in my tracks and reminded me what I told all my new friends this weekend: It is so important to protect the Constitution, and my client trusts me with his life, and I owe it to him, and everyone out there, to repay that trust.

God Bless America

Thursday, April 30, 2015

#BaltimoreRiots #BaltimoreProtests #FreddieGray Baltmore Protests


The shit has hit the fan once again.  This time it happened in Baltimore.

In case you live under a rock, there have been days and days of protests and a day or two of riots in Baltimore, Maryland, A.K.A. Charm City.  The civil unrest (the right has figured out long ago it is all about terms and coded language, and I believe the same holds true in court) was "sparked" by the death of Freddie Gray.  Freddie Gray died after the police arrested him.  Why did they arrest him? We are still not sure why.  The allegation is that the police saw Mr. Gray, made eye contact with him, and that he ran.  They then allegedly found a knife on his person.  

The fact of the matter is that running alone does not create probable cause to detain someone.  

Luckily, some bystanders were recording the incident on cell phone video.  The video shows Freddie Gray's legs limp, while he screams in agony.  At some point, his spinal chord became severed.  He died a week later.  One theory is that his injury occurred while being arrested, another theory is that his injury occurred while he was unbuckled in the paddy wagon. There is no doubt that he suffered his injuries in police custody.

It was only after his death that the protests turned into riots.  We have seen this time and time again.

The sad thing is that most white people only care that property is destroyed. 

The fact of the matter is that the problems run much deeper than the death of Freddie Gray.  Yes, police brutality, excessive force, not following proper procedure to ensure the safety of members of the community are a huge problem, but that is not all.  All of these problems can be directly linked to the war on drugs, poor educational systems, and lack of job opportunities. These are the systematic remnants of Jim Crow, which is the systematic remnant of slavery.  The ghettos of Baltimore, Ferguson, Houston, Dallas, and any city in the country are there because a group of people want them to be there so that they can profit from the subjugation of others. 

This country needs strong criminal defense lawyers.  This country needs strong public defenders. This country needs to stop the war on drugs.  This country needs to pay good teacher good money to teach in the ghetto.  This country needs soccer in the ghetto.  This country needs to invest in the ghetto.

Freddie Gray's death was the boiling point.  It was not the cause for the protests.

Sunday, April 26, 2015

DWI Second Plead to a First Is Good Result For My Client


My Motto is "Client Centered | Trial Ready."  I am trial ready in the sense that I build every case from day one to take it to trial.  I prepare every case from day one to take it to trial.  Every interaction I have with my client, the prosecutor and witnesses is with an eye towards trial.  I am not afraid to try a case.  I am client centered in the sense that my ultimate goal is to empower my clients to make the decision they think is best for themselves  I don't push clients to do one thing or another and I certainly don't force an issue. 

I won my first trial.  I got a not guilty on a felony sex case.  A few months after that big win I got a call from a guy I will call Martin, who was referred to me by the guy I got a not guilty for, John. Bobby was charged with his second DWI.  He spent 60 days in jail on his first DWI and wouldn't be willing to lose his job and do time in the slammer again.  He hired me because he wanted a trial.

This case was in the notorious Montgomery County.  If you didn't know, virtually every cop car has a dash camera.  The camera turns on automatically when an officer illuminates his lights, and your field sobriety tests will be recorded.  In this particular case, my client was pulled over because his license plate light was not working. 

Word to the Wise:  You can get pulled over for virtually anything that is wrong with your car.  This means make sure your inspection stickers and registration stickers are up to date, and that all of your lights and signals are working.

So my client get's pulled over, and does excellent on the field sobriety tests.  The only problems with my client's performance appears to be as a result of his poor understanding of English.  After the trooper placed my client under arrest for DWI, the trooper decides to play the DIC 24 on his computer.  The DIC 24 is a document that warns people arrested for DWI that they can either consent to a breath or blood test, or if they refuse, their license will be automatically suspended. 

My client requested that the DIC 24 be played in Spanish.  The cop played it in English.  My client then consented, even though he didn't have a license in the first place, which begs the question, why would he even consent if he had understsood the DIC 24 warnings?

I researched the issue and advised my client that we would have a good shot on a motion to suppress. A motion to suppress is a request to the court to exclude the results of a search.  Here, the search would have been his breath results because my client's consent was not freely, knowingly, and voluntarily given.  The problem here is that there is a totality of the circumstances test. In other words, do all of the facts and circumstances demonstrate that my client did not understand the DIC 24?

I felt confident that we would win.  The prosecutor knew that I had a good chance.  Normally, I wouldn't tell the prosecutor that I was thinking about doing a motion to suppress.  I told the prosecutor in this case for two reasons: (1) the remote possibility of a dismissal and (2) to improve my bargaining power since my client began to change his position on trial.

Did it work?  You bet!

The offer was originally 75 days in jail on a DWI second, and a $2000 fine. In other words, my client's next DWI arrest would be a felony.   My client ended up taking a plea deal on a DWI 1st, credit for time served, meaning that there would be no jail time, and a $1000 fine.

My client was happy, and that's what client centered lawyering is all about. 



Friday, April 24, 2015

Federal Human Trafficking "Tencha" Case Texas



Well over a year ago, just weeks after I have been sworn into practice law by Judge David Hittner, I was asked by a family friend who practices criminal law to help him write a brief for a federal sex trafficking case.

I jumped at the opportunity to make a few bucks and get some writing experience, in federal court, nonetheless. 

This case was about a massive human trafficking and sex slavery ring in Houston.  The ring was allegedly led by a family matriarch known as "Tencha."  She owned some property off Telephone road and her bars and restaurants as brothels.  Girls would be lured to America by promise of work and freedom, but instead they found themselves as indentured servants never able to pay off their debts, and forced to have sex with Johns to make payments.  The way this works is that guys show up to the bars, pay a door fee, then they pay exorbitant money for a few beers, then pay for a room fee, then pay for a condom, then pay for sex with the girl.  It is really horrible stuff.  It really makes you wonder what would happen to the human trafficking trade if prostitution were legalized.

So, a massive federal task force conducted a 10 year investigation into this brothel.  Can you imagine, they let this shit go on for 10 years?  What a joke.  Finally, they do a bust and arrest everyone at the scene.  Three of the girls who were arrested hire Ellis Munoz, who hires me to write a brief.

The government held our clients in federal custody because the government felt they were material witnesses.  In other words, they were victims of human trafficking and slavery that could help make the government's case. Our stance was that they were just at the wrong place at the wrong time, or just not material.

I wrote a nice long brief explaining the law and why our girls, who just wanted to go back to Mexico, were not material witnesses.  There was a hearing held in the magistrate's courtroom.  The hearing was basically depositions to find out who the material witnesses were. At this point, none of the 24 defendants had plead.  So there were 24 defendants in orange and green jumpsuits, and their high-powered lawyers.  

Then there was Ellis and I.  Examinations were conducted.  I was new and awkward and stupid, so I hurried off too lunch.   Little did I know, the magistrate made her recommendation that the our girls were not material witnesses.  The federal government fought very hard to make sure they were.

The recommendation, army of lawyers, and defendants moved to Judge Hittner's courtroom.  I was stupid and went to lunch.  Judge Hittner looked at Ellis and said something along the lines of "whoever wrote this did an excellent job."  JUDGE HITTNER, THE JUDGE WHO SWORE ME IN AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME IN FRONT OF HIS COURT SAID THAT ABOUT MY WORK AND I WASN'T THERE TO HEAR IT, AND HE DIDN'T EVEN REALIZE IT WAS ME.

Well, my motion was granted and the girls were allowed to get their live's back.  My first federal case, my first federal victory.  Come to think of it, that was my first case period. Ellis and I have worked together since then, including winning a NOT GUILTY VERDICT in my first trial on a felony solicitation of a minor case in Montgomery County, and motion to suppress that we also won.  I'm undefeated with him.

The Tencha case went to the jury yesterday.  It should be interesting to see what happens.

READ MY MOTION HERE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  HOUSTON DIVISION  
  
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  §   
  Plaintiff   §  CRIMINAL DOCKET 4:13-CR-628      §  HONORABLE NANCY JOHNSON    VS    §   
    §        §    HORTENCIA MEDELES-ARGUELLO  §      Defendant   §   
  
MATERIAL WITNESSES’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION REQUESTING DEPOSITION OF MATERIAL WITNESSES 
  TO THE HONORABLE NANCY JOHNSON: 
 The Defendant’s Motion Requesting Deposition of Material Witnesses should be denied 
because the Defendant failed to demonstrate that the Material Witnesses’ testimony will be 
favorable and material to her defense.  Moreover, the anticipated deposition testimony is 
cumulative, and the witnesses will respectfully invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination to any and all incriminating questions.  Should this Honorable Court allow the 
depositions, the Material Witnesses hereby request an inquiry into, and screening of, the proposed 
deposition questions. In support of their position, the Material Witnesses represented by the 
undersigned counsel would show: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On October 9, 2013, the United States indicted Hortencia Medeles-Arguello 
(“Defendant"), and thirteen co-conspirators, on one count of Sex Trafficking Conspiracy, 
2  
one count of Conspiracy to Harbor Illegal Aliens, four counts of Money Laundering and 
one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering. 
2. On October 10, 2013, a joint task force composed of several law enforcement agencies 
executed a search warrant at Nuevo Amanecer, 5618 Telephone Rd., Houston, Texas.   
Nuevo Amanecer was once known as Las Palmas Club and/or Las Palmas II.  Although 
that address was once owned by the Defendant, it had not been under her ownership for 
approximately one year before the raid.  Las Palmas Club ceased to exist in November 
2012. 
3. The task force decided to detain dozens of people found inside Nuevo Amanecer on 
October 10, 2013.  The arrested individuals were detained subject to removal proceedings 
by the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Enforcement Removal Operations.   
4. The federal agencies interrogated all of the arrestees.  None of the arrestees were 
represented by counsel.  None of the arrestees were advised of their Miranda rights.  None 
of the interrogations were conducted under oath or affirmation of perjury.  These 
interrogations form the basis of the Defendant's Motion to which this response addresses. 
5. On October 11, 2013, the Government filed an Affidavit in Support of Detention of 
Material Witnesses. (See, Affidavit in Support of Detention of Material Witnesses).  The 
Government determined that based on the aforementioned interviews, in which the 
arrestees were denied due process, that the "aliens can provide testimony that will be 
material to the prosecution of this case.  Specifically, the aliens can provide testimony 
related to Sex Trafficking, other illegal activities, and the day to day activities occurring at 
Las Palmas II.”   
3  
6. The Government continued, and requested twenty-five aliens to be detained as "Material 
Witnesses" pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3144, and order the United 
States Marshal to detain them so that depositions may be taken within thirty (30) days of 
the order.  This Honorable Court granted the order, as well as an extension of that order. 
7. The undersigned counsel was hired to represent six Material Witnesses: (1) Maria Hilda 
Duran Nava; (2) Angelica Lopez Leon; (3) Ana Karin Gutierrez Texis; (4) Elizabeth Martin 
Matias; (5) Maria Esther Casemiro-Deroteo; and (6) Natividad Hernandez Cerino.  Ms. 
Matias has been released from being a Material Witness.   
8. On November 27, 2013, at this Court's order, the Defendant submitted a Motion Requesting 
Deposition of Material Witnesses. (See, Defendant's Motion Requesting Deposition of 
Material Witnesses).   
9. The Defendant’s Motion includes summaries of the information the witnesses could testify 
about.  The summaries are based on the recorded interviews of the Material Witnesses 
conducted by law enforcement after the October 10, 2013, raid of Nuevo Amanecero.  The 
summaries strongly indicate that the Material Witnesses can provide no information that is 
favorable or material for the Defendant. (See, Defendant's Motion Requesting Deposition 
of Material Witnesses, P.5-9).    
10. The Defendant's Motion requests this Court to order the deposition of thirteen witnesses, 
including those represented by the undersigned counsel.  (See above, paragraph 7).   
11. On November 20, 2013, counsel for the Material Witnesses informed the Court that the 
Material Witnesses will invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
12. Eight (8) of the material witnesses have been released. 
4  
Material Witnesses Maria Casemiro-Doroteo and Nohemi Homan will be deposed on Friday, 
December 6, 2013. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MATERIAL WITNESSES’ TESTIMONY IS RELEVANT, FAVORABLE AND MATERIAL TO HER DEFENSE. 
This Honorable Court should deny the Defendant's Motion Requesting Deposition of 
Material Witnesses Maria Hilda Duran Nava, Angelica Lopez Leon, Ana Karin Gutierrez Texis, 
Elizabeth Martin Matias, Maria Esther Casemiro-Deroteo, and Natividad Hernandez Cerino.  The 
Defendant's Motion should be denied because she failed to demonstrate that the designated 
witnesses can offer testimony that is relevant, not cumulative, favorable and material to her 
defense. 
A. THE MATERIAL WITNESSES’ TESTIMONY FAILS TO REBUT THE GOVERNMENT’S ALLEGATIONS. 
The testimony of aliens who are not alleged to have any connection to a crime or 
conspiracy, and who cannot rebut the allegations against the defendant is inadmissible. U.S. v. 
Castellanos-Machorro, 512 F.2d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 1975).  In Castellanos-Machorro, a husband 
and wife were convicted of transporting, concealing, and conspiracy to transport and conceal 
aliens. Id. at 1182.  A Border Patrol agent, the five aliens they were accused of smuggling, and 
four former co-conspirators who drove the aliens and personally interacted with the defendants 
testified against the defendants.  Id.  (Emphasis added.)The defendants appealed, arguing that they 
were denied due process because they should have been allowed to interview 88 of the 288 aliens 
who we were detained and deported after being found traveling away from, or in the vicinity of 
the hotel managed by the defendants.  Id.     
5  
The circuit court held that the defendants were not denied due process.  Id. at 1184.  The 
court rationed that because there was no claim the released aliens had any connection to the 
conspiracy, or any transaction that formed the basis of the indictment, that their testimony was not 
“conceivably exculpatory.”  Id. at 1183.  The court continued, stating that the defendant-wife failed 
to offer a "persuasive basis" for concluding that the released aliens' testimony would be admissible.  
Id. (Emphasis added).  The court reasoned that the aliens' proffered testimony—that the defendant
wife did not smuggle them—even if true, would not be admissible because it "would not in any 
way impeach" the testimony of the witnesses who personally dealt with the defendant and her 
conspiracy.  Id. 1183-84. (Emphasis added).  
Here, the Defendant failed to offer a persuasive basis for concluding the testimony of the 
Material Witnesses will be admissible.  Like the deported aliens in Castellanos-Machorro, these 
aliens had no personal interaction with the Defendant, or transactions that formed the basis of her 
indictment.  Because the Material Witnesses had no contact with the Defendant, any testimony 
they might provide would not in any way impeach the sixteen Grand Jury witnesses.  (See, 
Criminal Indictment, P. 8-9).   
The only alleged connection between the Material Witnesses and the Defendant is that they 
were present in a building last owned by the Defendant a year before the raid.  Like the 288 
deported aliens in Castellanos-Macharro, the Material Witnesses here can only testify that the 
Defendant did not smuggle them, force them to prostitute, harbor them, traffic them for sex, aid 
them in laundering money, or any related conspiracy.  Like the deported aliens in Castellanos
Macharro, such testimony is only possible simply because they had little or no connection to Las 
Palmas or the Defendant, and not because they possess exculpatory knowledge.  Like the aliens in 
6  
Castellanos-Machorro, the Material Witnesses’ testimony is irrelevant, immaterial, and in no way 
rebuts or impeaches the government’s witnesses, as required under Castellanos-Machorro.   
B. THE MATERIAL WITNESSES’ TESTIMONY IS NEITHER FAVORABLE NOR CONSEQUENTIAL FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
The Defendant counterintuitively claims, without citing any authority, that she does not 
need to show that the Material Witnesses possess material knowledge.  (See, Defendant’s Motion 
Requesting Deposition of Material Witnesses, P. 4, Para. 13).  The government, however, is 
justified in promptly deporting alien witnesses after making a good faith determination that the 
witnesses possess no evidence favorable to the defendant in a criminal prosecution.  United States 
v. Romero-Cruz, 217 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2000); See, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 
U.S. 858, 872, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982).  Romero-Cruz defines materiality in the 
context of material witnesses.  Romero-Cruz, at 378.  Testimony is material if it impeaches another 
witness on a non-collateral matter, or there is a reasonable likelihood the witness’s testimony 
would have affected the judgment of the jury.   Id. 
In Romero-Cruz, the appellant drove a truck from Harlingen, Texas, to near San Manuel, 
Texas containing ten (10) illegal immigrants.  Id. at 378.  Eight (8) of the aliens were deported, 
while two (2) were deposed as material witnesses.  Id.  One of the deported witnesses, Flores
Martinez, stated that she and one of the deposed witnesses, Delgado, were driven from the border 
to Harlingen by a woman, and not the appellant. Id.  This was inconstant with the deposed witness’s 
testimony.  Id.   
The appellant claimed that the testimony of the deported aliens was favorable and material 
because it would have established he did not knowingly engage in illegal conduct.  Id.  The court 
held that the differing testimony was not material, because while Flores-Martinez’s statement may 
7  
have impeached Delgado’s testimony, the statement only impeached a collateral matter, and did 
not favorably aid the appellant.  Id.  Ultimately, the court held there was not a reasonable likelihood 
that Flores-Martinez’s statement would not have affected the judgment of the jury.  Id. 
The detained witnesses will not be able to provide material and favorable deposition 
testimony for the Defendant.   The Material Witnesses are simply ignorant of the Defendant, her 
business, and the allegations against her.  They can neither support the government’s allegations, 
nor aid the defense. Nothing the Material Witnesses can say will impeach the government’s 
witnesses on non-collateral matters, nor will anything they can say have a reasonable likelihood 
of affecting the jury’s judgment.  Simply put, anything they can say will be inconsequential and 
favor neither party.  The government is justified in promptly deporting the Material Witnesses 
without compelling their deposition testimony. 
C. ANY ADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY IS CUMULATIVE. 
Even where a deported alien’s testimony may have been favorable to the defense, the 
defendant’s due process and compulsory process rights are not violated where the defendant fails 
to show the testimony is not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses.  United 
States v. Perez, 217 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Romero-Cruz, 201 F.3d 374, 
376 (5th Cir. 2000).  Moreover, the government may deport undocumented alien witnesses upon 
a good faith showing that they do not possess information favorable to the defendant.  Id.  
In Perez, police received a tip that several aliens were being held hostage at a house until 
the smugglers were paid for their services.  Id. at 324.  Law enforcement set up surveillance and, 
after observing people freely come and go, executed a search warrant.  Id.  Twenty-four 
undocumented aliens were arrested.  Id.  The defendant, who lived in an apartment attached to the 
house, was charged with aiding and abetting the harboring of an undocumented alien.  Id. at 325.   
8  
The victim-daughter of the tipster disappeared after being released on bond, and several 
witnesses were deported.  Id. at 325-26.  Of the eight (8) aliens deported before the indictment was 
returned, six could not identify the defendant from a photo spread, and provided other relatively 
favorable information.  Id. at 236.  The defendant was able to depose six material witnesses.  Id.  
The Court held that although the deported witnesses may have provided favorable testimony, the 
defendant failed to show that their testimony was not merely cumulative.  Id. at 327. 
This Court named twenty-five (25) aliens found at Nuevo Amanecero as “material 
witnesses.”  Eight (8) of the material witnesses in total have been released from their designation 
as material witnesses.  The Defendant motioned to depose thirteen (13).  The undersigned counsel 
represents six (6) of those thirteen, one of whom has been released. Nearly all of the remaining 
witnesses can testify to the same cumulative things.  For example, as per the Defendant’s Motion, 
most of the Material Witnesses can testify: 
 That they did not work for the Defendant; 
 That they did not know the Defendant; 
 That they did not know what the Defendant did; 
 That they owned cell phones; 
 That the Defendant did not force them to buy cell phones; 
 That the Defendant did not take away their cell phones; 
 That the Defendant did not harbor them, 
 And that they had no interaction with the Defendant. 
Two material witness, Maria Casemiro-Doroteo and Nohemi Hogan, will be deposed 
Friday, December 6, 2013.  It follows that considering the circumstances of the raid, and 
9  
happenstance of the Material Witnesses presence at Nuevo Amanecer, and in light of the precedent 
set by Perez and Romero-Cruz, that all possible testimony they could offer is irrelevant and 
cumulative.   The Defendant has failed her burden of proving the proffered testimony is not 
cumulative.  The Material Witnesses have made a good faith showing that they can only provide 
cumulative testimony, and, per Perez, should be deported without being deposed.    
II. THE MATERIAL WITNESSES HAVE BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND ELECT TO EXERCISE THEIR FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
The Material Witnesses respectfully notify the Court that they will invoke their Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to any and all incriminating questioned at any 
deposition.  The Material Witnesses invoke this right because “[n]o person… shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. Const., amend. V. (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, a person may legitimately refuse to answer questions asked of her in any proceeding, 
civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in a future criminal 
proceeding.  United States v. Davidson, 2010 WL 3521726 (S.D. Tex., 2010), citing Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L. Ed.2d 274 (1973).   
Due process is afforded to all people present in this country.  Arab-American Anti
Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 833 F.Supp. 1365, 1373, (C.D. Cal., 1995).  It is irrelevant that 
the person is here illegally.  Id.  The Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment protect 
everyone from deprivations of life, liberty and property without due process of law, regardless of 
whether their entry into the country was unlawful, involuntary or transitory.  Mathews v. Diaz, 96 
S.Ct. 1883, 1890 (1976).   The Material Witnesses respectfully request that their liberty be 
reinstated by means of release from their detention as material witnesses. 
10  
In Davidson, the defendants were charged with two counts of conspiracy to harbor and/or 
induce aliens to come to or reside in the United States., and a tax fraud conspiracy.  Davidson at 
1.  1,200 aliens were arrested and deported as a result of the investigation against the defendants. 
Id.   One witness, Vargas-Sanchez, voluntarily spoke with defense counsel and was able to testify 
that the defendants did not assist his illegal entry into the country, provide him with false paper, 
or encourage his employment.  Id.  The defendants motioned to depose Vargas-Sanchez.  Id.   
Vargas-Sanchez advised that he would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination.  Id.  The Court ordered the deposition to be taken, and the witness asserted the 
privilege. Id. at 2.   The defendants objected to the assertion, but the Court held that Vargas
Sanchez properly invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, even though his testimony may 
have been exculpatory, because any answer might have given regarding his employment, papers, 
or entry into the country would incriminate him.  Id.  The Material witnesses will invoke their 
privilege against self-incrimination to any question which may incriminate them. 
III. IF THE MATERIAL WITNESSES ARE NOT RELEASED, THEY REQUEST THE COURT TO SCREEN DEPOSITION QUESTIONS. 
This Court should conduct an inquiry into the Material Witnesses’ assertion of privilege.  
See United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980)(“The trial judge must make a 
proper inquiry into the legitimacy and scope of the witness’ assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege.”)  The court may not accept a “blanket assertion of the privilege” without inquiry.  Id.  
The Material Witnesses suggest that the Court conduct a hearing to determine whether their fear 
of self-incrimination is justified and, if so, what the boundaries of his Fifth Amendment rights are 
in relation to the testimony the parties seek.  Id.  The witness may not have a valid claim to a Fifth 
Amendment privilege with respect to relevant questions about which the parties will inquire.  Id.  
11  
The Court “must make ‘a particularized inquiry, deciding in connection with each specific 
area that the questioning party wished to explore, whether or not the privilege is well-founded.’” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Melchor-Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir. 1976)).  The Material 
Witnesses may be totally excused as a witness “only if the court finds that he could ‘legitimately 
refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 
507 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir. 1975)).  “Otherwise, ‘only as to genuinely threatening questions 
should their silence (be) sustained.’” Id. (quoting Melchor-Moreno, 536 F.2d at 1049). 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the witness’s privilege claims must 
be judged by the standards of Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).  Id. at 700. 
Under Hoffman, the privilege applies where the witness has “‘reasonable cause to apprehend 
danger from a direct answer.’” Id. (quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486).   
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the questions that 
a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might implicate 
oneself.  The trial judge in appraising the claim “must be governed as much by his personal 
perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.”  The privilege must 
be sustained if it is not “‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in 
the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer(s) cannot possibly have such tendency’ 
to incriminate.” Goodwin, 625 F.2d at 700-01 (internal citations to Hoffman omitted). 
Consistent with prior Fifth Circuit case law, the Material Witnesses suggests that the Court 
ask the Defense to identify the questions it intends to elicit from them and then inquire of them 
12  
which questions he would object to on immunity grounds.  The Court may then determine whether 
the witness’s claims are valid as to relevant questions, inquiring further, ex parte, if necessary.1 
CONCLUSION 
The Material Witnesses have been denied due process. They are unable to provide 
testimony that is relevant, material and favorable for the Defendant.  Nothing the Material 
Witnesses can say will impeach the government’s witnesses on non-collateral matters.  Nothing 
the Material Witnesses can say will affect the jury’s deliberations.  Moreover, any admissible 
testimony is merely cumulative.   Should this Honorable Court permit the Defendant to depose the 
Material Witnesses, they ask the Court to screen the proposed questions to weed out incriminating 
questions. 
Respectfully submitte

Thursday, April 23, 2015

Appeals Filed and Trials Postponed


What an exhausting week!

First, I was set for a possession of marijuana trial in Harris County on 4/20.  I was so eager to try that case and hopefully get a NOT GUILTY on the marijauna holiday, but it wasn't to be.  For the second time.  The first time the case was set for trial it was reset because the district attorney thought that the day of trial would be a good time to turn over BRADY bodycam video.  I am sure glass I did not push forward without it ;).

This time, the case was reset because the judge wanted to get a two day trial out of the way, whereas mine would only take one day  Although I was disappointed to not try this case, it gave me time to finish up an appeal.  My appeal client was sentenced to life in prison for aggravated sexual assault of a child, which is the legal term for "rape" in Texas.  You'd think that a trial for this type of charge might take quite a while, but this trial only lasted two days and they sent my guy to the slammer for the long haul.

I was not the trial lawyer.  The trial lawyer was a guy who is infamous for being found ineffective multiple times, yet for some reason, the courts keep appointing this guy to cases (in my opinion it is because they way certain defendants locked up for life, and this guy's representation almost guarantees it).  I don't want to get into the details of the case, but I'll tell you what's important.

The complainant (what you might naturally as the victim) claimed my client diddled her.  The complainant also claimed that three boys raped her at a party in another county that were no-billed. Mind you, a prosecutor could indict a ham sandwich.  The prosecutors sent the trial lawyer a motion in limine that indicated the girl made accusations in the other county. (P.S.  This crappy notice is going to be a huge issue and a potential Brady violation if there is a writ filed.)  The trial lawyer didn't read the notice/motion and didn't request a continuance to investigate the allegations to see if they were false, which would be necessary to cross-examine/impeach the complainant at trial.

You might not think her prior false allegations of abuse are all that important, but they are huge, and particularly huge in this case.  Why?  Because the complainant claimed my client penetrated her, and touched her elsewhere.  Well, the nurse recovered my client's DNA everywhere the complainant said my client touched her, except in her vagina, AND the nurse testified that if he really did penetrate her vagina, his DNA should be there under the circumstances.  PHEW!  It's uncomfortable talking about this.  I don't like sex offenders and pedophiles, but if I'm not protecting their rights, your rights wont be protected.

So the point here is that if my client did not penetrate the girl, he is not guilty of aggravated sexual assault, which brings me to my second point, the court committed error by not including a jury charge for the lesser offense of indecency with a child.  

I don't know if my client is guilty, and it wouldn't effect my representation if I did or he was.  I never in a million years thought I would be an appellate lawyer in Texas, but it can be fun at times.  Now it is time to wait and see what happens.